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IDENTIFICATION AND SUBJECTIVATION 
A Theory of Ideological Interpellation
»L’idéologie interpelle les individus en sujets.« (Althusser)
If this thesis means that ideology interpellates individuals os subjects, 
then the constitution of subject escapes historical materialism. Since we know 
from Lacan that subject is an effect o f the signifier, and from  Benveniste that 
the signifying practice, as undertaken by an individual, is a discourse — the 
question arises as to the nature of the »other« discourse, the one that »con­
stitutes« the subject.
If this other discourse is not ideological, we are confronted by an uneasy 
question about a universal, yet non-ideological discourse underlying the whole 
field of inter-subjectivity: this at least demands that historical materialism 
should define its articulation with its specific exterior; at most, it undermines 
the historical-materialist thesis itself.
If this »other« discourse is ideological, then either we get trapped in a 
theoretical vicious circle, or we have to interpret Althusser’s thesis as meaning 
that the ideology interpellates individuals into subjects. But should the con­
sequence of this interpretation be that there are as many »subjects« as there 
are ideologies? This seems an unacceptable conclusion: for it either breaks 
down the ideological universe into as many communities as there are ideologies 
(and, from  the position »to each ideology — a certain type of subject«, leads 
to the evidently false position »to each community —  one and only one ideo­
logy«) or it postulates a transversal function linking together different ideo­
logical discourses. This transversal function (securing the effect of social 
totality) can easily be recognized as the dominant ideology —  but then the 
question arises: how does the dominant ideology excercise its transversal func­
tion, how does it »catch« individuals, if not by interpellating them into sub­
jects?
This essay will deal with this apparent short-circuit. W e shall approach 
the question of ideological interpellation through a theory of interpretation, 
and will try to show that, while subjectivation is a symbolic mechanism that 
has always the same structure, interpellation depends upon a mechanism of 
imaginary identification in which the ideological conflict as an instance of
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class struggle is being carried out. Althusser’s dictum will prove to be a valid 
indication if it is refined by the Lacanian distinction between the imaginary 
and symbolic orders.
1. A Theory of Interpretation
Linguistic (Ducrot) and philosophical (Grice) approaches to interpretation 
usually proceed from  a general principle of human communication which we 
can render in terms of the following syllogism:1
If an utterance is meaningful, then there must be a way to understand it: 
and this particular utterance is meaningful, since its speaker has offered it as 
such; so let’s try and find the way to understand it.
In addition to revealing the fundamental, even though anticlimactic fea­
ture that the proof of meaning of an utterance is its having been uttered, this 
formula rests upon the vague notion of a way that leads to understanding. 
No less vaguely, but maybe more productively, we may say that the meaning 
of an utterance can be understood from a certain »point of view«. Interpreters 
spontaneously assume that this »point of view« is nothing extradiscursive.
(1) You have missed the boat fo r  Eureka.
It seems that we could determine the meaning of (1) with the help of a 
disjunction: the speaker either believes that Eureka is a port, or he means 
»you are too late« by »you have missed the boat«. Unfortunately, by choosing 
one term one does not exclude the other. But the hearer can easily determine 
the meaning by deciding in what »capacity« he is being addressed by the 
speaker: either as a tourist travelling for Eureka — or as a Yugoslav worried 
about the course taken by his country in the block division of scientific re­
search.
(2) Let a hundred flow ers bloom.
To get the meaning of (2), it seems sufficient to know whether it was 
spoken by a horticultural advisor or by Mao Zedong; still, it may happen that
(2) is uttered by a speaker who can pretend to horticultural as well as to 
political discourse, like the last Emperor of China. The decision is therefore 
made, not in reference to the mundane entity of the speaker, but in reference 
to the capacity in which (s)he in is uttering her/his words.
(3) I have climbed to the top of the greasy pole.
It may certainly help to know whether (3) was uttered at a village fair 
or in a Victorian drawing room, still the decision as to its meaning would 
depend on the type of intersubjective structure non-univocally imposed by 
the utterance itself. (For most utterances, the »capacity in which they are 
being uttered«, the »capacity in which the hearer is being addressed by the
1 This principle is so general that it underlies otherwise different and even contrary epistemo- 
logical procedures; compare e. g., Searle’s treatment of »indirect speach acts« and Ducrot’s 
theory of presuppositions and sous-entendus (which denies both phenomenal and theore­
tical status to »indirect speach acts«).
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speaker« etc. are established by the utterance itself and are not pre-existent 
to it.) Knowing that Disraeli was the author of (3), we would most likely 
interpret it as an evaluation of a career, but a non-definite description »A  Bri­
tish Prime minister said (3)« would equally —  if not even better — do the job. 
The same would be the case if (3) were a third-person sentence, beginning 
with »He«, where »he« referred to a prime minister or to a similarly outstand­
ing person: but not if an equivalent of (3) were said of Mrs. Thatcher: in this 
case, the »metaphor« would be considered inappropriate, on the epistemolo- 
gically dubious grounds that the »proper meaning« (which is precisely the 
discounted meaning!) of the predicate describes an »unladylike« coup de force.
Not only a stylistic reserve, but a straightforward objection as to its 
truth might be produced by
(2’) Comrade Zdanov said: »Let a hundred flowers bloom.«
The most modest, and most revealing objection to (2’) would be: »But he 
did not mean it!« The reference to the speaker plays a paradoxical role here: 
first, it directs the interpreter to understand the quoted passage as a piece of 
political discourse and makes possible the decision as to its meaning ; secondly, 
on the grounds of this very interpretation, combined with supplemental infor­
mation we possess about the presumed speaker, it makes us deny the correct­
ness of the attribution of these words to this speaker. Still, this rightly dis­
claimed attribution was the only key to the meaning of the quoted utterance.
— Examples (1), (2), and (3) suggest that our interpretation is guided by 
a principle we may roughly resume in this w ay: for an utterance p to have 
a definite meaning, q has to be true.
An utterance p proposes itself as meaningful by the mere fact that it has 
been uttered (proposed as a meaningful »piece of behaviour« by its speaker); 
the mere act of uttering p therefore indicates the presence of an intersubjective 
(communicational) structure, but does not determine the actual pattern of this 
structure; instead it proposes a practically limited set of possible patterns: we 
can represent this set of possible structure patterns (i. e. of possible interpre­
tations) by a set of q-s; since different q-s determine different interpretations 
of p, the problem of interpretation can be represented as a disjunction of a 
limited set of conjunctions of p-s and q-s: (py & qt) V  (p2 & q2) V . .  . (pn & qu). 
The decision as to q decides about the meaning of p.
A  sentence becomes an utterance by being uttered by a speaker to a 
hearer in a conversational situation; the meaning of an utterance could well 
be deciphered by reference to the intersubjective situation —  were not the 
utterance itself a constitutive element o f this situation. The amphiboly of 
an utterance opens only on the ambiguity of the conversational situation: the 
interpreter gets two sets of terms about which to guess but the fact that both 
are closely interdependent (the decision as to one set resolves the indeterminacy 
of the other) does not help the making of the decision itself.
The ambiguity of (1) comes from  the uncertainty of the reference of the 
name Eureka and from the double meaning o f the phrase »to miss the boat«. 
Even if we could reduce the double meaning of the phrase, this would not fix  
the reference of the name which, in this case, defines the set of (two) possible 
interpretations. If the interpreter, searching for the conditions under which (1) 
may make sense in the given situation, formulates a set of propositions re-
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ferring both to the utterance and to the intersubjective situation, this mere 
expansion  o f the problem, combined with the additional »contextual« infor­
mation (s)he always possesses, gives her/him a fair chance to get (1) right.
The trouble w e had in trying to introduce Mrs. Thatcher into (3) as its 
subject shows that the decision as to q is not made on the basis of the crude 
criterion of something being true or false; not even on the grounds of the 
possibility o f some q being true. A  slippery notion o f appropriateness has 
imposed itself: Aristotle already demanded that a metaphor be »harmonious«, 
and prized above all the type of harmony he called »analogy«. We may then 
say that q expresses something that can »appropriately« be believed of p (or 
of some element of it) under one of the many interpretations of its meaning. 
Since, on the other hand, we can replace the vague notion of »the meaning 
of an utterance p« by »the possibility to believe that p«,2 we have brought 
both components, p and q, under the same modality of (possible) belief — i. e. 
we have succeeded in bringing them into the realm of ideology.
Example (2’) confirms our speculation: the name of Zdanov places (2) 
within a particular debate about cultural politics, and thus yields the principle 
of interpretation (the same would be achieved by »a Communist leader« or 
even by »a com rade«); the meaning, determined on the basis of the principle 
o f interpretation (suggested  by the name), then falsifies the attribution of (2) 
to the bearer of the name (if the interpreter knows about Zdanovism; but 
if he did not know, he would most likely be unable to produce the proper 
interpretation of (2) in the first place).
(4) Brûlé de plus de feu x  que je n’en allumai.
The Alexandrine verse, together with the first person singular, suffice to 
interpret these fires as meaning the pangs of disprized love, even abusively 
in the subordinate clause: for the cultural (ideological) prejudice linking the 
effects of fire with feelings of unreciprocated love is a common enough heri­
tage, while particular information about the speaker of this line Pyrrhus, 
to the effect that he excelled at the burning down of Troy, is needed fully 
to appreciate this »syllepsis o f metaphor« (as Fontanier calls it).
The »spontaneous« »mis«-interpretation of (4) shows an important fea­
ture of the pricinple o f interpretation : that it tends to extend its power beyond 
the scope that may, under analysis, appear as its legitimate domain. In (4), 
the (»illegitimately«) trespassed limit was the one traditionally understood as 
the difference between the »metaphorical« and the »proper« meanings. The 
»metaphorical« meaning imposed itself abusively, because supported by an 
ideology still in pow er; to do justice to the »proper« meaning (of »fire« in 
the subordinate), it was necessary to introduce another »point of view«, based 
upon the »factual information« provided by Greek mythology, i. e. to introduce 
another principle of interpretation, brought in from another ideology. Fasci­
nated by the ideological gratification of »getting the meaning«, the reader 
may easily yield to the interpellation by a cliché (which, in respect to Racine,
2 This is an extension of Davidson’s theory of meaning. For Davidson, the meaning of an 
utterance is the same as its truth-conditions. Meaning in general would then be »-the capacity 
of being true«; since, on the other hand and according to Davidson, only utterances (as op­
posed to sentences) have meaning, we may force the next step and claim that the »meaning« 
is »what some speakers at certain times may hold to be true«.
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quite contingently comes from  romantic lyrics), and miss the other interpel­
lation equally available in (4).
The possibility of an interpretational principle stretching its power beyond 
its legitimate domain is just a marginal case pointing to a more general, and 
more dramatic phenomenon: that a principle of interpretation may function 
in a way that appears altogether illegitimate from  another »point of view«,
i. e. from  another ideological position. Such »interpretational imperialism« is 
possible only if complemented by the inverse operation of »switching off« 
the power of some other interpretational principle. This is obviously a pheno­
menon of ideological struggle, and we have still to determine what decides 
about failure or success in it. In (4), the »spontaneous« ideological reading is 
dictated by the romantic norm — a phenomenon quite inexplicable after more 
than a century of modernism, were it not blatant proof of the power of the 
school apparatus, in the field of literary studies still in the grips of (liberal, 
individualistic, »expressive«) bourgeois ideology.
(5) Waldheim and the Austrians are deeply hurt.
(Headline in the daily Delo, 4/30/87)
We may ask (but the reader is not supposed to) whether (5) is one utterance 
or whether there are two utterances glued together in it: »Waldheim is hurt. 
The Austrians are hurt.« If there are two utterances, then w e may be prone 
to ask if their glueing together does not derive from  a homonymy of pre­
dicates rather than from their synonymy (»being hurt in one’s feelings« — 
»being hurt in one’s international interests«). The tendency of (5) is precisely 
to prevent the reader from posing this type of questions: its interpretational 
principle postulates the existence of a modality of being hurt that constitutes 
the imaginary community »Waldheim and the Austrians« —  precisely the 
affective state that was the material basis of the last presidential election 
in Austria.
The dramaticity of phenomena like (5) holds to their not being a »picture« 
of some extra-discursive reality; on the contrary, they are constructive of 
social reality, i. e. they establish the basis of self-evidence upon which social 
relations are built. (The result of the last presidential election in Austria was 
produced by precisely utterances like (5).) Only as far as »it goes by itself« does 
an ideology have interpellative force.3
(6) Was allein hier herrscht, ist Freiheit, Gleichheit, Eigentum und Bentham.
(Marx, Das Kapital, MEW 23, 189)
To the revolutionary bourgeois slogan »Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité«, Marx 
affixes a dyad that both imposes a new interpretational principle and demy­
stifies the original one. The idea is to strip the bourgeois dictum of its false
* The phrase »-it goes without saying« strikes at the heart of the matter: an ideology suggests 
how what is said is to be taken. It is often enough to make it »speak out« to destroy its 
interpellative magic. — As to the possibility that an ideology »constructs« the »outer« 
social world, we may put it in traditional terms: traditionally speaking, the difference 
between the »inner« and the »outer« world being that, contrary to the latter, the former 
does not know the »essence/appearance« distinction, so that »inner« things are what they 
seem to be — ideology acts upon the »inner« world by inducing »appearances« that instantly 
turn into »essences«. In this methodologically solipsistic manner, we may minimalistically 
claim that the self-definition (or: self-perception) o f a subject enters into his/her inter- 
subjective relations. As we have admitted that this self-definition of a subject is an ideolo­
gical product, we have thus demonstrated that, even under those extremely unsuitable epi- 
stemological presuppositions, it follows that the ideology is constructive of social reality.
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universality (of its interpellative force), and to exhibit its »proper« principle 
of believability as a stratagem in the class struggle; the elegance is to do it 
on stylistic level, not to »preach« it — i. e., to do it on the proper level of 
ideological conflict.
—  The ideological interpellation is therefore a formal mechanism: the 
interpellated individual identifies himself with a position from which an 
interpellative utterance might be meanigfully pronounced: this is a position 
from  which it may be believed  that an utterance »makes sense« — and once 
the individual is situated in this position, the abstract meaningfulness magically 
transforms itself into a definite meaning. This description reveals the central 
feature that »yielding to an ideological interpellation« is something that the 
interpreter (the addressee) actively achieves. This is precisely what the young 
Marx calls the self-production of the human being. But the interpellation is 
doubly productive: it is not only a self-production of the conscious self, but 
also a causation of the unconscious subject. We are holding here a possibility 
for a theoretical articulation o f the two contradictory effects of ideological 
interpellation: while identifying her/his conscious self with a presumingly 
universal »image« of the understanding speaker-hearer, the unconscious sub­
ject (effect of an always idiosyncratic mechanism) arises at a place that sup­
ports the identifying operation.
On the level of the signifying disposition (of the »material body« of an 
utterance), the most an interpreter can achieve is to formulate a dilemma as 
to the meaning: either qt or q2, but not both (this dilemma dominates the 
dependent one: either p t or p2, but not both).4 The field of the signifier is by 
definition nonsaturated and can offer no support for a meaning-yielding de­
cision. But it suffices to introduce a purely illusionary element, that of belief, 
and the meaning magically arises. By the same movement, the individual un­
conscious subject situates her-himself at the point of the non-saturation of 
the signifier: the ideology has interpellated the individual as-into subject.
2. Identification
It remains to define the identification point — the axis of interpellation 
proper. We have already said that what the interpreter contributes to the 
interpretation is her/his belief in the interpretability of an utterance. There 
have been attempts to define the utterer’s meaning as a set of propositional 
attitudes. E. g., the speaker’s meaning of an imperative can be defined as 
follows : S (the speaker) believes that p is good, +  S desires that p be made 
true, +  S believes that H (the hearer) can make p come true, +  S desires 
that H make p come true. —  To this set PA t another element should be 
added —  PAä: S believes that H will make p  come true if (s)he (S) commu­
nicates to H that PAj and PA2. This last propositional attitude (PA2) is 
sui-referential : it takes into account that an utterance not only says! some­
4 This is the reason for the basic legitimacy of Quine’s skepticism (the impossibility of ra­
dical translation) and of Davidson’s refined version of it (the »impossibility-« of radical 
interpretation: a native interpreter has no advantage over a complete foreigner). According 
to our theory, Davidson is basically right in seeking the solution by introducing the pro- 
positional attitudes, esp. belief. We differ from him in not looking for a »calculus of propo­
sitional attitudes«, inspired by the theory of games; instead, we will try to derive the basic 
attitude of belief from a theory of Freudian phantasy (see infra).
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thing, but also says2 something about the way it is saying! something (cf. Du­
crot, Le dire et le dit). But at the very heart of this absolute proximity of an 
utterance to itself, of its suireferentiality, a third element intervenes: the very 
possibility of PA2 depends upon the possibility that the hearer understands 
what is being communicated to her/him. So that an objective element of belief 
should be interpolated into PA2: S believes that it is possible to believe that 
the hearer will make p come true if S communicates to H that PA t and PA 2.
This is the point of solidarity upon which the interpellative effect depends: 
just as the speaker believes that it is possible to believe that the hearer will 
understand her/his utterance, so the hearer believes that it is possible to believe 
that a certain utterance makes sense. The mutual identification of the two 
agents has a material support in its mediator, the subject supposed to believe, 
whose existence is guaranteed by the mere existence of a common language.
We can now see why, with a successful ideological interpellation, it seems 
enough to »understand« an utterance to yield to its interpellative force. It is 
a common experience that the presence of a third party gives a special addi­
tional force to orders, promises, insults and the like. We may refine this point 
and say that the mere possibility that a third party witnesses our linguistic 
transactions has the same effect. And we may generalize the point and say 
that this »third party« functions in this way only as an empirical incarnation of 
the general social responsibility, ethical awareness etc. common to human 
beings as human, i. e. social beings. The general condition for a third party 
to act as an ethical instance of our linguistic transactions is that they be 
carried out in an intelligible way. This same condition applies to their being 
linguistic, and even transactions at all. This adds up to the conclusion that 
the conditions of uttering and understanding are the same as the conditions 
of moral sanction. Therefore, by the mere act of understanding, I »create« 
the sufficient condition for the »third person’s« moral, i. e. ideological sanction : 
I submit myself to the »Subject« of ideology in Althusser’s terminology, i. e. 
I produce the subject-supposed-to believe, the material support of the ideo­
logical constraint.
So far, we have been describing mechanisms o f successful interpellation. 
We have still to define the conditions an interpellation has to meet in order 
to be successful at all.
3. The phantasy
(6) 1 won’t be the first President to lose a war.
There are two possible interpretations of this utterance of L. B. Johnson, 
depending on two different interpretational principles:
(a) (6) & Johnson has a specific interpretation of the U. S. history.
(b) (6) & the U. S. never lost a war.
According to our prima vista criterion (that the interpretational principle 
should be a proposition referring both to the utterance and to its situational 
context), (a) has much better chances of imposing itself than (b): still, we feel 
(and history has demonstrated) that (b) is the ideologically privileged inter-
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pretation. To say that (b) is being imposed by the dominant ideology is not 
an answer, it only sharpens the question: what makes the force of the domi­
nant ideology?
We are dealing with the tenacity of commonplaces, and may find a lead 
in what seems to be their most confusing feature: their utter irrationality. 
To take the extreme cases of racial prejudice, nationalistic hatred or sex chau­
vinism, we clearly see that those are stereotypes that cannot possibly be 
accepted except in the modality of sheer belief. To their interpreter, they 
pose a radical dilemma: is this pure nonsense or .. . is it to be believed? (This 
dilemma, of course, does not explicitly occur in a successful interpellation: 
explicitly posed, it is destructive of interpellation; implicitly answered, it 
triggers it.) If the interpreter adopts a spontaneous (i. e. ideological) attitude, 
her/his desire is to save the meaningfulness of the utterance, which, regardless 
of her/his choice as to the radical dilemma, forces her/him into the position: 
credo quia absurdum.
The advantage of (6-b) over (6-a) resides exactly in its being universal 
and void, i. e. that it invites an intuitive agreement and precludes an analytical 
approach; on the other hand, (6-a) already implictly refers to (6-b) as to a 
»universally accepted truth« that can only be challenged by a specific justifi­
cation: this is precisely the relation between a dominant and a non-hegemonic 
ideology, in which the dominant ideology defines the field of the argument 
in advance, while the burden of justification falls upon the subordinated 
ideology.
The criterion for a »successful« interpretational principle is thus its de­
bility, that is, the formal necessity that it be an object of belief: this same 
feature makes it a point at which desire (that an utterance be meaningful, i. e. 
that it be possible to treat it as a string of signifiers) and constraint (the com­
pulsion to believe) coincide. It has the structure of Freudian phantasy. It is 
now clear that there need not be a specific interpretational principle for each 
utterance: the same principle may guide the interpretation of a whole set — 
the shift from one principle to another being marked by a typical moment 
of bewilderment on the part of the interpreter: »How am I to take this?«
Having introduced the concept of Freudian phantasy, we can and must 
refine our notion of interpretational principle: as far as it is the justification 
that the interpreter can, in some way or other, provide for her/his interpre­
tation of any particular utterance, it depends on the interpreter’s identification 
with the subject-supposed-to believe, an instance of the solidarity between 
the speaker and the hearer, since the speaker, having produced what (s)he 
believes to be a meaningful string of signifiers, has already identified her-/ 
himself with this same instance; on the other hand, as a formal matrix of 
the sense/nonsense alternative that both imposes the constraint of belief on 
the subject and »responds« to her/his desire,5 it is the material basis of the 
identification process, because it is the subject-constitutive phantasy. To the 
formal criterion (of the sense/nonsense alternative), we must therefore add 
another one: if a phantasy is to be socially (i. e. ideologically) operative, it 
must be capable of catching the always idiosyncratic individual unconscious
5 The belief is the privileged (and maybe the only) selffulfilling modality of desire: any 
form of renouncement is supported by the belief that it gives someone else pleasure — and 
is gratified by this mere supposition. The libidinal economy of belief makes »the subject 
supposed to enjoy« a necessary complement to »the subject supposed to believe«. (Cf. R. 
Močnik, 1985, and Grosrichard 1987, Preface by M. Dolar.)
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phantasies. It must be able to function as a cloaca maxima draining individual 
phantasies into a social dimension.
»Y ou ’ve been very kind to me,« said the young gentleman. »That’s why 
I came.«
»I’m always kind to people who have good Louis Quatorze. It’s very rare 
now, and there’s no telling what one may get by it.« With which the left-hand 
corner of Madame Merle’s mouth gave expression to the joke.
But he looked, in spite of it, literally apprehensive and consistently stre­
nuous. »Ah, I thought you liked me for m yself!«
»I like you very much: but, if you please, w e w on ’t analyse. Pardon me 
if I seem patronising, but I think you a perfect little gentleman . . .«
(Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady.)
This, of course, is a perfect example of Romanesque double talk, on the 
general tendentious background of the novelistic critique of social reification 
à la Goldmann. Still, it would have no artistic dimension, had not the men­
tion of Louis Quatorze a specific function within the depicted dialogue itself. 
What the young gentleman fails to catch is a relatively well-intended advice 
he is being given, and which he could appropriately take had he read Sallust 
before having decided to propose in Rome. A  phrase in De hello Iugurthino —
— »Romae omnia venalia esse« — gives weight to the antique porcelain argu­
ment, and, if used as an interpretational principle, helps to convey the message 
»When in Rome, do as the Romans do«. The milleniary success of the Sal- 
lustian apperception that makes it as relevant to-day as it presumably was 
in 1876, can be easily understood if we consider what grain should be added 
to the heap of goods on sale to make them »omnia«, everything: namely, sexual 
favours. It is this feature, together with its universal and »unbelievable« 
pretension, that qualifies it as phantasy; hence its paradoxical character: un- 
verifiable by definition, it can neither be falsified6 —  and imposes itself trans- 
historically and transideologically.
Much has been said about the relationship between ideology and reality, 
and symptomatically, no attempt to define it can avoid some contradiction.7 
This necessary contradiction derives from  the contradictory nature of ideology 
itself — from  its being a part of the very reality upon which it »operates«. 
In addition to Engels’s model of Wiederspiegeln  and Althusser’s concept of 
représentation imaginaire, there is a much better way to think this para­
doxical »relation« which not only embraces both these concepts but also has 
the advantage not to presuppose a difference of nature betw een ideology and 
the material upon which it operates: this concept is the Freudian concept of 
sekundäre Bearbeitung (traditionally translated as »secondary revision« ; al­
though this translation underlines an important dimension of the concept, 
we prefer the more literal one: »secondary elaboration«).
6 »Nothing can be done about your nose, because there is nothing wrong about it.« — the 
analyst Ruth MacBrunswick to Wolfsmann.
7 Here is a recent example, importantly coming from a historian who takes ideology seriously. 
»Ideology, as we know, is not a reflexion of reality, but a way to act upon it. For this 
action to have at least some effect, there should not be too large a gap between the illusionary 
representation and the ,reality* of life.-« (Georges Duby, 1978.)
Ideology is posed both outside the social reality (as an instrument to act upon it) and in­
side it (its importance for a historian comes from its being a social fact among others). The 
solution of situating ideology at an intermediate distance, not too close — not too far, from 
the reality, is symptomatic for its utopian indetermination.
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4. Ideology as Secondary Elaboration
Secondary elaboration is a dream mechanism that unifies the dream ma­
terial.8 Freud describes it, almost in Marxist style, as a tendentious revision,9 
and has some trouble in situating it.10 This difficulty derives from the nature 
o f the secondary elaboration:
1. On the one hand, it is already an interpretation: it interprets the results
of the dream-work, and is therefore no part of it.
2. On the other hand, it is a tendentious or a deformed interpretation;
the character of distortion assimilates it to the dream-work.
Secondary elaboration thus presents a sense of the dream — but this is
a false sense. Without it, the dream is a heap of disconnected fragments — 
with it, it has a sense, but not the true one. With the secondary elaboration, 
w e get a sense, but as this is not the sense of the dream, it makes us lose 
the sense. The only motive to the secondary elaboration is the claim of intelli­
gibility of the dream-material; and its only achievement is a falsification of 
what is there to be understood. The fascinating result of the secondary elabo­
ration is that the intelligibility blocks the understanding.
Freud explains this paradox by an analogy:
» . . .  Before we start upon the analysis of a dream we have to clear the 
ground of this attempt at an interpretation.
. . .  It [the secondary elaboration] behaves towards the dream-content lying 
before it just as our normal psychical activity behaves in general towards 
any perceptual content that may be presented to it. It understands that content 
on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas, and arranges it, even in the moment 
o f perceiving it, on the presupposition of its being intelligible; in so doing, 
it runs a risk of falsifying it, and in fact, if it cannot bring it into line with 
anything familiar, is prey to the strangest misunderstandings. As is well known, 
we are incapable of seeing a series of unfamiliar sings or of hearing a succès-
8 The thing that distinguishes and at the same time reveals this part of the dream-work is its
purpose. This function behaves in the manner which the poet maliciously ascribes to philo­
sophers: it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and patches (Heine, »Die
Heimkehr«). As a result o f its efforts, the dream loses its appearance of absurdity and dis­
connectedness and approximates to the model of an intelligible experience. . . . Dreams . ..  
appear to have a meaning, but that meaning is as far removed as possible from their true 
significance. (The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud 1900.)
9 Ibidem.
10 In the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and in On Dreams (1901), secondary elaboration is
supposed to be a part o f the dream-work, even though its less important part, not even
necessarily present in every dream. In An Evidential Dream (Ein Traum als Beweismittel, 
1913), Freud already doubts if the secondary elaboration makes a part of the dream-work, 
and finds a Solomonic solution to get rid of the problem : »Secondary revision by the 
conscious agency is here reckoned as part of the dream-work. Even if one were to separate 
it, this would not involve any alteration in our conception. We should then have to say: 
dreams in the analytic sense comprise the dream-work proper together with the secondary 
revision of its products.-« (Ibid., XII, 274—275.) In his article on »Psycho-Analysis-«, contri­
buted to Marcuse’s Handwörterbuch, Freud states that »strictly speaking«, the secondary 
elaboration »does not form a part of the dream-work« (Ibid., 241) Freud’s hesitation can be 
best shown if we confront the following two passages: »Are we to suppose that what hap­
pens is that in the first instance the dream constructing factors . . . put together a provi­
sional dream-content out o f the material provided, and that this content is subsequently 
re-cast so as to conform so far as possible to the demands of a second agency? This is 
scarcely probable. We must assume rather that from the very first the demands of this 
second factor constitute one of the conditions which the dream must satisfy and that this 
condition . . . operates simultaneously in a conductive and selective sense upon the mass 
of material present in the clream-thoughts.« (Ibid., V, 499.) — »I shall not deal exhaustively 
with this part of the dream-work, and will therefore merely remark that the easiest way 
of forming an idea of its nature is to suppose — though the supposition probably does not 
meet the facts — that it only comes into operation AFTER the dream-content has already 
been constructed.« (Ibid., V, 666.)
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sion of unknown words, without at once falsifying the perception from  consi­
derations of intelligibility, on the basis o f something already known to us.«
This is Freud — the materialist at w ork: the whole is the untrue. The 
analogy with the Marxist problem of the illusion of totality as the result of 
the ideological totalisation, is more than an analogy. The illusion of totality 
is a »lie«, but this »lie« is a part of the non-totalisable material itself. Dreams, 
dictated by sexual desire, are as non-totalisable as society, torn and constituted 
by class struggle. »Structure« is not a whole precisely because the illusion 
of its wholeness is a part of it.
This, of course, is only the leftist element in Freud; to stop here would 
be to yield to the infant malady of materialism. Freud’s genius was to submit 
this malady to analysis, and here its name is Phantasie, wishful phantasy.
The interpretation presented by the secondary elaboration is a false inter­
pretation; as far as it is false, it is no interpretation, it is a part of the dream- 
work; and as far as it is a part of the dream-work, it is a part of the truth 
of the dream: therefore, the result o f the secondary elaboration is »true« 
precisely inasmuch as it is »false«.
Although this may be an excessively logicist deduction, it nevertheless 
exactly reproduces Freud’s point: what is false in the distorting operation, is 
not the distortion itself, but its interpretational character: it is the »conside­
ration of intelligibility«, the claim of a »sense« that is »false«.
According to Freud, the secondary elaboration builds up a façade of 
coherence for the dream: this façade has to be broken in order to get to 
the latent dream-content. Still, this does not mean it should be discounted: 
for its framework is not accidental, it is made of pre-fabricated dream ma­
terial:
»It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these dream-façades are 
nothing other than mistaken and somewhat arbitrary revisions of the dream- 
content by the conscious agency of our mental life. In the erection of a dream- 
façade, use is not infrequently made of wishful phantasies which are present 
in the dream-thoughts in a pre-constructed form, and are of the same character 
as the appropriately named »day dreams« familiar to us in waking life. The 
wishful phantasies revealed by analysis in night-dreams often turn out to be 
repetitions or modified versions of scenes from  infancy; thus, in some cases, 
the façade of the dream directly reveals the dream’s actual nucleus, distorted 
by an admixture of other material.« (The paragraph added to On Dreams in 
1911; ibid., V , 667.)
»Now there is one case in which it is to a great extent spared the labour 
of, as it were, building up a façade of the dream — the case, namely, in which 
a formation of that kind already exists, available for use in the material of 
the dream-thoughts. I am in the habit of describing the element in the dream- 
thoughts which I have in mind as a ,phantasy1 [^Phantasie“].«11 (The Inter­
pretation of Dreams, ibid., V, 491.)
11 Later in this text, we come across this important statement: »Hysterical simptoms are not 
attached to actual memories, but to phantasies erected on the basis of memories.-« — in 
an addendum to his letter to Fließ of May 2. 1897, Freud specified that idea: »Phantasies 
are psychical façades constructed in order to bar the way to these memories [of primal 
scenes].«
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The phantasy is thus what Lacan calls the point de capiton, the quilting 
point, an element common both to the façade and to what it conceals.
— The positive response to an ideological interpellation is also made in 
the name of a claim of sense: it is this claim that pushes the interpellated 
individual towards an identification  with the subject-supposed-to believe. The 
active part played by the interpellated individual consists precisely in her/his 
helping to establish »a façade« —  an ideological effect of coherence. The iden­
tification process is impossible, and the façade is likely to break down if they 
are not supported by a particular element — the element of phantasy satisfying 
the two conditions of being non-sensical (and thus necessarily an object of 
pure belief) and of offering a catch upon which the particular individual’s 
idiosyncratic wishful phantasies may be attached. This element is typically 
void of any explicit class-content or tendency12 and presents the same confusing 
mixture of universal pretension and singular idiocy as the Freudian Phantasie. 
(In (6), we referred to the phantasy of Western imperialism; later, we added 
the phantasy of the decline of the West; we could put on the same list the 
phantasy of Oriental despotism, and any number of racist stereotypes.) In 
addition, being a quilting point, it is what punctually connects the ideological 
façade with its specific exterior: the so-called »social reality«; it is typically 
an inert string of signifiers, capable of being inserted into different façade 
»interpretations« (cf. the classical Freudian example »Ein Kind wird geschla­
gen« —  »A  child is being beaten.«). It is an inert set o f signifiers, »behind« 
which there is »nothing« ■— nothing but the hiatus that makes the social struc­
ture unwhole, the hiatus of the class-struggle.
Being a cover that covers a hole in the whole, it is what is »the most real« 
in an ideology. The »test of reality« for an ideology, is performed by testing 
its capacity to incorporate this obturator into a convincing (coherent, unifying) 
ideological façade: therefore, many conflictual ideologies may compete around 
the same phantasy — offering diverse class-interested interpretations of this 
non-sensical marker of the class struggle. It is their incorporation of the phan­
tasy that guarantees them the »appropriate« intermediary distance from the 
»reality«: ideologies do not situate themselves en face to the social reality, 
they construe it around the absence of the social »real« (in the Lacanian 
sense), the class struggle, marked in their discourse by a stereotype, the 
phantasy.
That is why ideological conflict is possible at all: it is a struggle for the 
interpretation o f something that finally resists any interpretation, and thus 
opens the field of ideological warfare. That is why the theory may be of some 
assistance to the ideological class struggle: in its enlightened moment, it can 
»dem ystify« mystifications, and isolate the kernel of nonsense they contain; 
in its materialist moment, it analyses the logic of mystification, and opens 
the breach of intervention —  an intervention carried out through the alleys 
of signifier, resisting the temptation to reduce the phantasy, but confronting 
it and, with some chance, getting over it — getting over with it.
”  Analysing the Belgrade trial against the six dissident intellectuals (1984—1985), we discovered 
this element in the popular phantasy oi a football match »à la Yougoslave«. (Močnik, 1985a.)
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